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 Publicly funded market reporting began nearly a century 
ago. One factor leading to public market reporting even at that 
time was concern regarding competitiveness, efficiency, and 
fairness in agricultural markets. A second factor was need for 
information by the Federal government related to agricultural 
price incentives during World War I. After World War II, Con-
gress greatly expanded the voluntary price reporting system in 
cooperation with state departments of agriculture (Henderson, 
Schrader, and Rhodes).
 Several market structure trends have led to issues related 
to market transparency, thin markets, noncompetitive markets, 
and asymmetry of information between buyers and sellers 
for price discovery during the past three decades.  While 
mandatory price reporting was mentioned as an alternative 
as early as 1983, it received relatively little attention for the 
next two decades. Much of the thinking about public price 
reporting changed markedly in 1999. Unexpectedly strong 
populist support led to Congressional passage of the Livestock 
Mandatory Reporting Act. The Act mandated the Agricultural 
Marketing Service (AMS) of USDA to implement an entirely 
new, mandatory system of price reporting for most livestock 
and meat products, which was achieved in April 2001. 
 The objective of this fact sheet is to provide an assess-
ment of the mandatory price reporting (MPR) system.  Several 
issues are identified regarding passage of MPR, including two 
critical problems in the early implementation of the Act.
Initial Reactions to MPR and Problems
 Several new or modified reports resulted from MPR.  Read-
ers can see available reports at the AMS website http://www.
ams.usda.gov/lsmnpubs/ .  While a few reports were modified 
or added at some time following initial implementation of MPR, 
most were available with advent of the new system.
 Two reactions were immediate. First, it was difficult to find 
“comparable information” to voluntary price reporting (VPR). 
Some types of information and some data series were dis-
continued. Sometimes the information format was changed, 
but the data series remained reasonably comparable to that 
under VPR. Changes created minor or major disruptions in 
data and information series market participants may have used 
regularly. Some information was new, thus was not comparable 
with anything under VPR.
 Second, many reports were not available due to confiden-
tiality conflicts.  Non-reportable reports was one of two serious 
problems created by MPR.  Initially, AMS instituted a 3/60 rule 
regarding confidentiality. Data were reported only if at least 
three firms supplied the data and no single entity accounted 
for 60 percent or more of the data for each respective report-
ing period.  With regional and national four-firm concentration 
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ratios in steer and heifer slaughter more than 75 percent, 
many fed cattle price reports were unavailable.  AMS was 
forced to revise its 3/60 rule and create a 3/70/20 rule. For 
the preceding 60 days, at least three firms must be reporting 
transactions 50 percent of the time. No single firm can have 
70 percent or more of all trades in a reporting period. No single 
firm can be the sole reporting firm 20 percent of the time.  This 
modification greatly reduced non-reporting problems created 
by the initial confidentiality rule.  Grunewald, Schroeder, and 
Ward noted that 81 percent of regional and national, daily 
afternoon fed cattle reports from April 2 to August 17, 2001, 
were withheld.  After the confidentiality rule change, all such 
reports were reported between August 20, 2001 and April 2, 
2002. 
 Another problem surfaced shortly after moving to MPR; 
this one resulting in a lawsuit which went to trial in April 2006. 
For a six-week period, a software error at AMS underreported 
boxed beef prices.  While the software error was ultimately 
corrected, USDA made no known attempt to determine the 
number and extent of those adversely affected, and con-
versely those experiencing unforeseen gains, nor to provide 
compensation or transfers associated with the errors. Losses 
to cattlemen were estimated at $42.8M and some producers 
alleged that packers knew of the errors and intentionally bid 
lower than market conditions warranted. A U.S. District Court 
ruled in favor of producers’ allegations. Jurors recommended 
fines of $9.25 million were assessed on three of the largest 
packers.  One packer was not found liable. The case is under 
appeal at this time.
Evaluation and Assessment
 Research has addressed various aspects of mandatory 
price reporting.
	 Feedlot Managers’ Reaction – First was a survey of 
cattle feeders located in Iowa, Nebraska, Kansas, and Texas 
in March 2002 (Grunewald, Schroeder, and Ward). Feeders 
were asked several questions pertaining to MPR and its re-
ports.  Feeder opinions varied widely. One key question was 
whether MPR benefited the industry. Among respondents, 
49 percent expressed some level of disagreement on a nine-
point scale while another 28 percent expressed some level of 
agreement that MPR did benefit the industry. Areas of large 
commercial cattle feeders (Kansas and Texas) were more apt 
to disagree compared with an area characterized by smaller 
farmer feeders (Iowa). Certainly, responses must be evalu-
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ated relative to cattle feeders’ expectations for the move to 
MPR.  Given other responses in the survey to questions of 
packer concentration and captive supplies, and much debate 
over these issues in the beef industry over the past several 
years, it can be argued farmer feeders and cattle producers 
in the upper Midwest, Plains, and Mountain states were more 
concerned about VPR than feeders and producers in the more 
concentrated cattle feeding areas.  Thus, regional differences 
regarding benefits from MPR could have been anticipated.
 Feeders were asked if MPR increased information on 
fed cattle prices, base prices in grids, and boxed beef prices. 
Again, there was rather sharp disparity among respondents. 
Fifty-seven percent disagreed to some degree and 20 percent 
agreed.  These reactions could have been affected by several 
factors; reduced reports for some regions, reduced timeliness 
of certain reports, and confidentiality problems immediately 
after implementing MPR.
 A major reason for supporting MPR was to have increased 
information for price discovery.  Feeders were asked whether 
MPR enhanced their ability to negotiate cash market prices, 
base prices for grids, formulas, or premiums/discounts with 
packers.  Nearly 3/4 of responses (71 percent) disagreed to 
some extent while only 10 percent agreed.  As before, there 
was more apt to be disagreement among feeders in Nebraska 
or Iowa than in Kansas and Texas.  Here also, the response 
is likely influenced by expectations, some of which seemed 
unrealistic as the proposed legislation was being debated.
 Captive Supply Information – Ward (2004a, 2004b) 
argued that MPR increased information in some areas, though 
his focus was on discussing captive supplies with the “new” 
data series and not on assessing MPR.  In particular, he used 
data generated by MPR on prices and volumes of fed cattle 
purchases by packers using alternative procurement methods. 
He argued that MPR significantly improved the amount, type, 
and timeliness of data related to captive supplies compared 
with information available prior to implementing MPR.  Post-
MPR, data were available on prices and volumes of fed cattle 
purchases by negotiated trading, formula trading, forward 
contracting, and packer owned cattle (volume only). This 
enabled comparing prices paid by packers across procure-
ment methods, something which had only been possible after 
special data collection efforts by the Grain Inspection, Packers, 
and Stockyards Administration (GIPSA). Thus, transparency 
was enhanced considerably in this area.  Still, reaction to the 
increased information was critical by some producer groups; 
especially those who expected far more transparency than 
most analysts would have anticipated, given privacy and con-
fidentiality concerns.  These producers also expected large 
price differences between prices paid by procurement methods, 
reflecting expectations regarding “sweetheart deals” between 
large packers and feeders, which Ward did not find.
	 Economic Research Service (ERS) Assessment 
– Research by ERS considered MPR from several vantage 
points (Perry et al.).  They extended the work by Ward (2004a, 
2004b) with another year’s data. Findings were generally 
similar.  However, Perry et al. suggested that MPR may have 
contributed to a reduction in formula trading of fed cattle and 
an increase in negotiated trading.  While they did not prove 
a causal relationship, circumstantial evidence lends support 
to their argument. However, other market factors not consid-
ered may have had a substantial influence. If MPR did in fact 
contribute to the reversal of a trend toward increased formula 
trading, subsequent surveys of cattle feeders should be much 
more positive about the benefits of MPR and the influence 
MPR has had on price discovery and transparency.
 Perry et al. also examined price volatility before and after 
implementing MPR. They concluded prices were twice as 
volatile under MPR, which was unexpected to the research 
team. One explanation relates to the filtering role of market 
reporters under VPR relative to their reduced filtering role with 
MPR. Prior to MPR, market reporters would seek to report 
the bulk of trades, thus omitting extreme high and low prices. 
In effect, this reduced both the range of prices reported and 
the variance of reported prices. This effect should have been 
anticipated given AMS’ experience a few years ago with hogs. 
There, AMS began reporting weighted average slaughter hog 
prices, thus including more of the extreme or full range of ob-
servations.  The effect was a wider price range and increased 
variability of the reported prices.
	 Report for Congress – A Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) review focused on USDA’s MPR procedures, 
especially on the role of market reporters and audits of the 
packers reporting prices and volumes. They found that the 
filtering role of market reporters continue, though it was much 
decreased compared with VPR.  During a three-month sample 
period in 2005, market reporters omitted nearly 9 percent of 
cattle transactions which statistically altered the weighted 
average price during this period.  For many users of the MPR 
data, this was a greater filtering role than was likely anticipated. 
USDA’s response was to improve their instructions to market 
reporters regarding excluding transactions.
 USDA audits of packers revealed that nearly 2/3 of the 
time, errors were found in packers’ reporting of prices (Govern-
ment Accountability Office). While these represented a small 
(but unstated) percentage of trades, GAO argued that USDA 
had not adequately addressed the misreporting by certain 
packers. USDA responded that steps have been taken to 
improve the audit process.
 Lastly, the GAO report noted the lack of coordination 
between GIPSA and AMS regarding reported prices under 
MPR.  The two agencies have long argued their legal authority 
prevents sharing of information. In particular, with MPR, much 
very useful price and volume data on livestock procurement 
are available daily to AMS which would be valuable to GIPSA 
in monitoring and investigating anticompetitive claims or 
questionable trades. This lack of coordination goes beyond the 
MPR legislation per	se, but the GAO report may have raised 
this issue sufficiently to attract the attention of key members 
of Congress.
	 Retail Price Reporting – The MPR legislation directed 
USDA to develop a broader, more representative measure 
of retail meat prices. Lensing and Purcell compared retail 
meat prices reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) 
with scanner-based prices, which included price featuring by 
retailers, resulting from the MPR mandate. They found that 
quantity-weighted, monthly average retail prices for five of six 
beef items were lower than BLS prices. Quantity-weighted 
prices also had a higher variance for five of the six retail items. 
Lensing and Purcell found that simple averaging of weekly 
prices to generate monthly average prices overstated prices 
and increased empirical own-price elasticity estimates.  They 
recommend continuing to use quantity weighted retail prices 
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calculated from scanner data.  Further, they recommend con-
tinuing the procedures developed by the Economic Research 
Service of USDA to improve retail meat price reporting as 
directed by the Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act. Use of 
scanner data appears to be a step toward improving retail meat 
price reporting though a number of issues remain regarding 
its use on a continual basis.
Summary and Conclusions
 Evidence to date suggests the following conclusions to 
this author.
• USDA was mandated to switch to mandatory price report-
ing (MPR) with relatively short lead time.  As a result, at 
least two key problems arose shortly after implementa-
tion which likely negatively influenced survey reactions 
to MPR.
• After more experience with MPR, evidence suggests 
considerably more information is now available in	some	
areas than was available with MPR, thus enabling certain 
kinds of analyses on a regular basis than was possible 
with VPR.  However, the value of reported information 
depends in part of the uses for the information and the 
associated importance of accuracy and timeliness.
• MPR has increased transparency and price reporting 
accuracy based on available data but not necessarily 
to the point of being so transparent as to invite collusive 
behavior among buyers.
• USDA is continuing to improve the MPR system both in 
terms of modifying reports and in developing effective 
internal procedures to report prices and audit data reported 
to AMS.
• Retail scanner data should continue to be used to cal-
culate and report retail meat prices and quantities, giv-
ing economists better data with which to estimate meat 
demand models and to use more accurate price elasticity 
estimates.
 The switch from VPR to MPR was a major change.  In 
some regards, we still have inadequate information to measure 
the gain in transparency or price reporting accuracy from the 
new system compared with its predecessor. However, two 
factors suggest potentially greater satisfaction with MPR now 
than initially, compared with VPR:
• Increased familiarity over time with data and information 
available from MPR.
• Enhanced confidence in reported prices after USDA’s 
modification of the initial confidentiality rule and correction 
of the reported boxed beef price.
 It seems clear that various research and information by 
agricultural economists tend to validate improvements made 
by moving from MPR relative to VPR.
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